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Abstract 
 
 This study investigates the impact of technological advancement in community bank 
lending, more specifically, how online financial product and service offerings affect community 
banks’ performance. Community banks, institutions with assets under $1 billion are praised as 
relationship banking specialists, are important source of credit to individuals and businesses. Their 
productive performance is highly beneficial for the economic development of the communities and 
customers that they serve, yet community banks’ competitive power against large banks has 
become increasingly more challenging. Technological advancements radically shift all production 
and service based industries, including the banking industry and its institutions’ offerings. The 
increasing use of online products and services provides convenience for bank customers, and 
eventually creates more demand, and boosts up the industry competition. Regarding the impact of 
technological advancements in the banking industry and the specific position that community 
banks carries, the question arises of “How does a changing technological landscape affect 
community banks’ performance?”. This study aims to contribute to the understanding of how these 
institutions can better utilize their limited resources to improve their performances.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 The increasingly common use of technology in banking has resulted in the development of 
online financial products and services that cater to clients of all categories from personal to 
commercial. Online financial products/services are convenient and allow customers greater 
flexibility without having to resort to the traditional method of going to a physical location. By 
eliminating the need of a physical presence, traditional methods of obtaining financial 
products/services such as relationship lending have been examined as to their usefulness. 
Relationship lending, a practice that requires sustained, multiple interactions between the client 
and bank (Bodenhorn, 2001) may not be necessary when the same financial product/service can 
be obtained online.  
The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between two major concepts: 
technological advancement and community bank performance. Technological advancement is 
measured through the number of online financial products/services that each institution offered 
through their website. These online financial products/services were grouped between four 
categories: personal, business, commercial, and total. Community bank performance is measured 
through performance ratios and values obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). These performance ratios and values included are Net Interest Margin, Loan and Lease 
Loss Provision to Assets, Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Net Charge Offs to Loans, and Loss 
Allowance to Loans. By analyzing the potential relationship between these two groups of 
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variables, this study would like to better understand the effectiveness of online product/service 
offerings. That information could then lead to these institutions’ better utilization of their resources 
to maximize performance in the form of risk and return. By doing so, the study may provide some 
additional insight on how the use of technology has affected community bank performance and 
how online offerings may support or diminish relationship banking practice.  
To answer the question of “How does technological advancement affect community bank 
performance?”, annual data was collected for the year of 2017. Community banks were filtered 
from all financial institutions in the state of Florida and data was collected from banks’ respective 
websites along with the FDIC. I then used Descriptive statistics and correlation tables to see the 
correlation between the number of online financial product/service offerings on bank performance. 
The study found a positive relationship (increasing) between the number of online financial 
product/service offerings and the performance of the institution. These findings contribute to the 
literature by providing initial empirical evidence that as institutions invest into online products and 
service offerings by creating more convenience to their clients (and also collecting more 
information due to usage), they can improve their performance in regards to both risk and return.   
The study begins with a literature review on relationship lending, its advantages and 
disadvantages, and its importance to community banks. In chapter 3, the actual data decision and 
collection process is discussed. Following this, chapter 4 discusses the hypothesis that was formed 
from preliminary information. Chapter 5 details the variables that were defined to organize the 
information that reveals the relationship between technological advancement and community bank 
3 
 
performance. Chapter 6 discusses the limitations of the study while chapter 7 finishes with 
concluding remarks. 
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2. Literature Review  
2.1. What is Relationship Lending?  
 
In this section, I establish what exactly I define as relationship lending and under what 
context and constraints I will apply to that definition. Relationship lending can be conducted by 
any lender such as a commercial bank, finance company, or small community bank to a third party. 
Besides offering lending services such as loans, letters of credit (L/C), and equipment financing, 
the business of relationship lending may also involve the sale of other products or services such as 
treasury management. The practice of relationship lending, the transferring of complicated ‘soft’ 
information between individuals, is and always has been, an integral part of the U.S. economy. As 
an important source of credit to small businesses, new changes in technological advancement have 
both increased efficiency and the complexity of bank-consumer exchanges. In an area of banking 
where opaque information is vital but difficult to value, the question arises as to how a changing 
technological landscape will affect this long-performed practice.  
The necessity of relationship lending is created because of the unusual problem that 
individuals and businesses have when seeking out avenues to fund their enterprises. Potentially 
too small and obscure to be able to issue stock or participate in the bond market and yet too large 
to require the services of retail banks or rely upon individual loans, businesses struggle to acquire 
credit to fund growth. Unlike large companies and corporations with obligations to show financial 
statements and have access to public bond markets, smaller, untraded firms are more reliant on a 
bank-borrower relationship (Berger, 1995). Relationship lending tackles the issue of asymmetric 
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information and informational opacity from the borrower by developing a borrower-lender 
relationship, relationship lending. Lenders, such as commercial banks are valuable to both parties 
because by participating in the relationship the bank is able to have a greater depth of knowledge 
into a borrower’s details. By having insider information, the bank can adjust the terms of a contract 
to be specifically designed for the client such as the amount of interest that they will pay on a loan 
or the collateral that the bank will require from them (Berger, 1995). The bank can design such a 
specific product because of the information obtained through the course of the relationship and the 
credit arrangement that was designed, but also by other services that the customer may have with 
the bank such as deposit accounts. (Berger, 1995). However, removing the barrier of information 
asymmetry is not only performed through the bank-borrower relationship. Lenders are able to 
design a contract that is tailored to the customer’s needs based on the risk that the lender perceives 
of the customer. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the lender to understand their borrower to 
the greatest extent possible.  
When deciding the type of credit to make available to the borrower, the lender will obtain 
information anywhere from the borrower’s deposit accounts to the history of the firm, character of 
its owners and management team, their involvement and standing with the community, and the 
borrower’s own suppliers and customers (Berger, 2002). Obtaining information from every source 
is critical to the relationship because in many cases, the information is not easily verifiable. For a 
small business, these examples of ‘soft’ information are not easily translatable into numbers and 
specific measurements but can make the difference in the pricing and credit availability in a 
contract (Berger, 2002). The ‘relationship’ in ‘relationship lending’ is as a result of the exchange 
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of opaque information between the bank and borrower but also the continual exchange of this 
information over repeated interactions.  
However, it must be noted that a long or even exclusive relationship does not necessarily 
imply a good one (Bodenhorn, 2001). Borrowers that maintain a long relationship but only 
purchase the use of a letter of credit to be used on an as needed basis is still a weak relationship. 
Infrequent interaction such as this does not build up informational advantage that is valued for 
relationship lending. Lenders require a long relationship with multiple interactions in order to 
create a strong picture of the client and to refine the contract terms that best identifies their risk. 
By doing so, it helps remove the informational opacity that makes small businesses so reliant upon 
bank financing (Bodenhorn, 2001).  
Relationship lending also emphasizes the comparative advantage that this interaction 
between bank and borrower to remove the issue of asymmetric information has over de novo 
lenders that are unfamiliar with the business (Boot, 1999). As to what specifically relationship 
banking entails, “I define relationship banking as the provision of financial services by a financial 
intermediary that:  
i. invests in obtaining customer-specific information, often proprietary in nature; and  
ii. evaluates the profitability of these investments through multiple interactions with the 
same customer over time and/or across products.” (Boot, 1999) 
And as to the nature of relationship lending:  
7 
 
“i. Relationship lending leaves room for flexibility and discretion in contracts that permits 
the utilization of subtle, noncontractable information, thereby facilitating implicit long term 
contracting.  
ii. Relationship lending may include extensive covenants that allow for a better control of 
potential conflicts of interest.  
iii. Relationship lending may involve collateral (e.g., as in asset-based lending) that needs 
to be monitored. In fact, the need for such lending and monitoring may make the proximity of a 
relationship financier essential; otherwise, lending might not occur at all.  
iv. Relationship lending could permit the funding of loans that are not profitable for the 
bank from a short-term perspective but may be profitable if the relationship with the borrower lasts 
long enough. As I shall see, the reason for this is that long relationships make possible value-
enhancing intertemporal transfers in loan pricing.” (Boot, 1999) 
 
2.2. Advantages of Relationship Lending  
2.2.1. Borrower’s Perspective  
 
I will explore the benefits that borrowers obtain from participating in relationship lending. 
Among the most valued benefits to the borrower in a bank-borrower relationship is the evidence 
of lower interest rates and being less likely to pledge collateral than other small firms that don’t 
participate in relationship lending. Essentially, borrowers find it easier to negotiate loan terms if 
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they have a relationship with the bank (Berger, 1995). As the issue of asymmetric information 
declines, there is an increase in ‘trust’. The borrower obtains a reputation of being low-risk and 
therefore is allowed greater amounts of responsibility which translates to lower interest rates and 
a decline in likelihood of providing collateral requirements. This is done in the expectation that 
with their history and with the information obtained about their business, they will be able to fulfill 
their financial obligations and repay any borrowed credit.  
Strong relationships also lead to several other benefits besides lower interest rates and less 
likely having to pledge collateral such as a lower dependence on the need for trade debt, greater 
protection against the interest rate cycles and fluctuations, and an increase in credit availability 
both for normal business operations and during a crisis (Berger, 2002). Another reason as to why 
the bank is able to offer these benefits to the borrower as a result of a stronger relationship is as a 
result of cost savings.  
Borrowers prove themselves as responsible risks through their reputation which 
simultaneously causes the bank’s moral hazard to decline (Blackwell, 1997). With a borrower’s 
strong reputation, banks are less inclined to constantly monitor and protect themselves against the 
risk of the borrower being unable to pay the loan. With less monitoring, these cost savings are 
passed down to the borrower in the form of lower interest rates on average (Blackwell, 1997). The 
bank is incentivized to offer these lower interest rates from their cost savings due to external 
competition with other banks. If a borrower were to concentrate their borrowing into one lender, 
this would allow that sole lender to have a greater depth of insider information and understanding 
of the borrower’s risk (Blackwell, 1997).  
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The informational advantages as a result of repeated borrowing is where the value of 
relationship lending is emphasized by lower interest rates, lower guarantees, and a greater 
likelihood of still having access to credit by having a relationship even during adverse 
environmental financial panics and downturns (Bodenhorn, 2001).  
The value of the benefits that relationship lending can offer to borrowers is in the discretion 
that the contracts terms can be renegotiated. Flexibility and discretion is the value (Boot, 1999). 
Having discretion, especially with the issue of asymmetric ‘soft’ information is especially valuable 
in the bank-borrower relationship and is the reason why lenders will occasionally take a short-term 
loss in the recognition that they will recoup this later in the relationship, known as an intertemporal 
smoothing of contract terms. (Boot, 1999). Flexibility is beneficial to both the borrower for being 
able to obtain credit even during a short-term loss but also to the lender for being able to benefit 
in the long-term relationship. To the borrower, relationship lending allows them an opportunity to 
receive credit that other institutions would not offer them. Especially de novo lenders, who would 
realize that these small businesses pose very serious adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
and would likely not take the risk to lend to them (Boot 1999). Having a reliable relationship gives 
borrowers an avenue that understands that short-term losses are not long-term failures.  
 
2.2.2. Lender’s Perspective  
 
I took a reciprocal view of the bank-borrower relationship by examining the benefits that 
relationship lending gives the lender. In terms of the issue of informational opacity and asymmetry, 
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bank’s benefit from their relationship with borrowers by being able to obtain increasing amounts 
of private information that allow them to better gauge the risk they are undertaking when making 
a contract (Berger, 1995). Having insider information better insulates the bank from risk by 
allowing them to identify the likelihood of the borrower repaying their loan and making good with 
their financial obligations.  
Protecting themselves from risk is their main concern and relationship lending has a greater 
significant value than pure numbers from financial statements, collateral, and credit score (Berger, 
2002). These numbers reflect management decision making, but this is much better understood 
with the insider information obtained from relationship lending and allows them to position 
themselves better for issues in relation to informational opacity (Berger, 2002). Apart from simply 
knowing more than a transactional lender, relationship lending, and the nature and ease of being 
able to tailor contracts to best suit the needs of the stakeholders also benefit the lender by allowing 
them certain strategies to better insulate themselves from risk.  
This lies in contract covenants that allow the lender to mitigate agency costs if suboptimal 
information is received from the business (Bodenhorn, 2001). The ease of renegotiation allows the 
lender to safely protect itself by imposing stricter standards or requirements if necessary.  
Besides reducing agency costs, extensive covenants are able to guide the bank-borrower 
relationship and mitigate conflicts of interest between the two parties (Boot, 1999). Other than 
using its informational advantage to protect itself, relationship lending also allows the bank to 
enter as an overall package of selling products and services to the small business.  
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Relationship lending may not even be the main service that is offered to the customer but 
can be used as a foot in the door to cross-sell more lucrative products and services such as 
payments, savings, and advisory services (de la Torre, 2010). Lenders may cross-sell more 
lucrative products both to maximize their capital but also to deepen the relationship and 
engagement that they have with the borrower. By doing so, the lender increases the likelihood that 
they will be the borrower’s principal bank and may potentially increase the chances of attracting 
clients associated with the borrower such as their employees, owners, and families (de la Torre, 
2010). These ‘sticky’ products also make a borrower less likely to leave the relationship as they 
are heavily invested into it with a large portion of their business reliant upon the strength of the 
relationship. Lenders such as commercial banks also receive several benefits in relationship 
lending as a result of their size. An example of this is that they can take advantage of economies 
of scale when it comes to processes such as credit scoring models that need a large number of 
customers and financial products or when using their large resource of service platforms, technical 
expertise, and IT and back-office to accommodate non-lending services. Additionally, large 
commercial banks are also better able to use more complex and sophisticated business models and 
risk management systems which not only becomes a more accurate gauge of the customers is, but 
also decreases their exposure to risk (de la Torre, 2010). The lender’s benefit in relationship 
lending in their access to sensitive information of small businesses but also in their wide power of 
available products services that they can sell and the economies of scale that they can use, 
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2.2.3. Regulator’s Perspective  
 
Separate from both parties in a bank-borrower relationship, I analyze the perspective of 
government regulators in the advantages of relationship lending. Relationship lending may help 
impede the “decline of banking” where “securitization and nonbank competition are reducing the 
share of loans held by banks” (Berger, 1995). The value of relationship lending prevents the 
decline of loans because of the benefits that borrowers receive from a bank-borrower relationship. 
Individuals and finance companies can offer loans to borrowers, but few can provide the 
advantages that relationship lending with a bank can offer. From a regulator’s perspective, the 
strength of relationship lending is important as a reliable source of funding to a growing 
entrepreneurial class that relies on banks to obtain credit. Simultaneously speaking, competition 
between other banks may also increase the importance of relationship lending. Relationship 
lending differentiates one bank from another and increases the value that customers see between 
banks.  
Banks therefore may focus more effort to become more client-driven in the expectation 
that it will separate them from other banks (Boot, 1999). This is valuable as a means of banks 
continuously competing against one another to provide the best service to the borrower and 
customer. Even with the numerous advantages that large commercial banks seemingly have over 
other lenders, relationship lending is also an advantage to small community banks. The specific 
characteristic of the uniqueness of the relationship can help prevent the complete penetration of 
small-business lending by large banks. The small bank advantage is in the fact that it is a small 
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bank which means that there may be a greater depth of the local relationship between the bank and 
the borrower. There may be greater personal contact between the bank and the opaque business 
which would not be affected as much by changing technologies. Similarly, the contract and loan 
terms that the business maintains would potentially be the same as in previous decades and they 
want to have a bank that understands they don’t want to change.  
Small banks may also have an organizational advantage of decision makers when it comes 
to authority and bureaucracy. Small banks are also likely not to be commoditized and can compete 
with others by being innovative (Elyasiani, 2004). Essentially, relationship lending is extremely 
competitive and involves multiple lenders with a unique advantage over their specific borrower 
due to that relationship. Due to this, there will never likely be one sole lender that will control a 
large portion of market share because of the competitive nature of relationships and informational 
asymmetry. 
 
2.3. Disadvantages of Relationship Lending  
2.3.1. Borrower’s Perspective  
 
I begin to view the borrower’s perspective on the disadvantages of relationship lending and 
how it may be harmful to the business. For small businesses, there is a large informational issue 
between those who own the firm and those that the firm relies upon for credit. The informational 
asymmetry makes it difficult for them to obtain external financing. This is most emphasized when 
outsiders are not willing to lend credit to a small business because they cannot identify if the firm 
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has a quality project (adverse selection problem) that will recoup the return of the initial 
investment, or even ensure that the credit will be used to fund another project (moral hazard 
problem) (Berger, 2002). With such informational opacity, small businesses are heavily reliant and 
vulnerable to large commercial banks.  
Since they are so reliant and because they are so difficult to understand, borrowers face a 
high equilibrium interest rate when they initially seek credit (Blackwell 1997). This problem is 
even worse because not only do they face high interest rates during equilibrium, but if there is 
disequilibrium they are even more at risk of either paying higher interest rates or not having access 
to credit at all. Their reliance on commercial banks also highlights another issue with relationship 
lending. The firm’s informational opacity is a struggle to understand and creates a high barrier of 
entry to obtain credit from a lender. But once a relationship is developed, the bank has the 
opportunity to exploit the informational advantage.  
The issue is exacerbated when banks are located in concentrated markets that have a large 
degree of market power (Bodenhorn, 2001). Essentially, this means that to obtain credit from a 
lender, borrowers must not only sacrifice at high interest rates to have access, but they are also 
unable to escape the relationship due to the fact that they may have to pay switching costs and may 
not have any other options to obtain financing. The fear that the commercial bank will cause the 
borrower to be locked into paying a high interest rate causes some borrowers to avoid borrowing 
from the bank which will be a loss of potential investment opportunities, known as the hold-up 
problem. If the borrower decides to maintain multiple bank relationships then they will decrease 
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the likelihood of becoming informationally captured but they also decrease their availability of 
credit because of a reduction in the value of acquiring the business’s information (Boot, 1999).  
Having multiple lenders increases the price of access to credit while simultaneously 
reducing its availability (Elyasiani, 2004). If multiple lenders are aware of insider information, 
then there is no competition to provide better products or services. Small businesses have to pay 
the initially high interest rates because of a lack of reputable history that certifies them as good 
credit risks but also because taking on a loan is a form of certification that the borrower is safe. 
Since bank loans are the lowest in priority during repayment in the case of the business becoming 
bankrupt, willingness to loan to the borrower indicates to the rest of the market that all higher 
claims are safe from risk (Elyasiani, 2004). 
 
2.3.2. Lender’s Perspective  
 
Although the lender, usually a bank, has many incentives to participate in relationship 
lending there are also several risks and dangers by extending credit to borrowers. Chief among the 
issues that banks face as a result of relationship lending is the agency problem that arises between 
the relationship manager/loan officer and the bank that they work for. The issue results from the 
opaque nature of small businesses and the importance of ‘soft’ information when making decisions 
of extending credit. Since the exchange of information most directly happens between the 
borrower and the loan officer as opposed to the borrower and the bank, it makes sense that more 
authority be given to the loan officer who has access to this information. However, this increase 
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in authority is what creates the agency problem (Berger, 2002). The problem lies in differing 
incentives especially on the part of the loan officer. The loan officer is driven by profit and may 
therefore decide to focus on generating new loans from new customers as opposed to monitoring 
their current relationships due to either a short horizon or incentive-based pay based on portfolio 
growth. Likewise, the loan officer may also be motivated by personal gain to hide negative 
information about a borrower’s credit quality due to “a personal friendship with the owner, the 
prospect of a future job offers from the firm, an undisclosed financial interest in the firm, or illegal 
kickbacks” (Berger, 2002). Not only do banks face the agency problem when delegating more 
authority to loan officers, but they also need to pay higher monitoring costs to review loan officer 
actions to prevent these issues.  These risks are most prevalent due to the fact of differing 
incentives, but a large organizational structure also increases the likelihood of the agency problem 
arising as opposed to “a small, closely-held organization with few managerial layers” (Berger, 
2002). The large organizational structure combined with the difficulty in transferring ‘soft’ 
information between individuals would likely increase the magnitude of the contracting problem 
(Berger, 2002). ‘Soft’ information that is shared between borrowers and their loan officers is 
difficult to translate from loan officers to the bank as a whole. Since the ‘soft’ information is vital 
to decision making, commercial banks may attempt to simplify the data through “standardized 
credit policies based on easily observable, verifiable, and transmittable data” (Berger, 2002). Using 
this tactic may backfire by adopting the very characteristics that separates relationship lending 
from transactional lending. Another issue of relationship lending that commercial banks face is 
simply the distance between their place of operations and their customers. The large physical 
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distance makes it more difficult to exchange the “soft, locally- based relationship information to 
senior bank management” (Berger, 2002) which can escalate any issues already present in the 
relationship. Additionally, besides internal risks, commercial banks also face issues relating to 
extending credit to borrowers. One of these issues is the soft budget constraint problem. Basically, 
borrowers understand that the most important obligation that the commercial bank has is to itself 
and to the loan. Therefore, a distressed firm may take advantage of this obligation by seeking credit 
when they become distressed to postpone bankruptcy or defaulting on the loan (Bodenhorn, 2001). 
The commercial bank then needs to decide of whether there is a greater value in allowing the 
borrower to default on the loan and to liquidate and collateral or assets that would make up the 
value or to extend further amounts of credit to the distressed firm in the expectation that they will 
be able to regain profitability to repay the loan. 
But herein lies one of the issues of relationship lending to the lender, the advantage of the 
ease of loan renegotiation can also be a disadvantage from borrowers that may exert insufficient 
effort to repay the loan and hostage the commercial bank from preventing a bad outcome (Boot, 
1999). To a borrower, they have a hold on the lender due to fear of having a loan default and then 
rely on liquefying collateral or the fear of lending more money which can result in a greater loss.  
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2.3.3. Regulator’s Perspective  
 
From a regulator’s point of view, relationship lending is inherently risky to both consumers 
and to the economy as a whole because of its ingrained nature of capturing information. The 
relationship that is developed between a customer and lender is more valuable than the book value 
of assets that is written into a contract (Berger, 1995). Value is created, immeasurably, by the 
information that is exchanged between the two parties. That information, is the value. A bank 
failure can lead to more than a paper loss. Aside from causing greater than can be measured 
monetarily, the practice of relationship lending also increases the risk to small businesses if the 
bank were to fail. The relationship that has been established fails and the small business is forced 
into a credit crunch where they may have to accept terms and conditions from another lender 
without the benefit of ‘soft’ information (Berger, 1995).  
 Regulators may also view the risk of relationship lending and the nature of ‘soft’ 
information by the organizational structure of the lending institution. Relationship lending may 
not only increase the risk of an agency problem between the loan officer and the bank that they 
represent, but it also may increase complexity and inefficiency. Essentially, there lies a contracting 
problem as a bank increases in size in complexity. Small lenders are able to resolve their issues 
quickly by eliminating several managerial layers and bureaucratic processes that result in 
organizational diseconomies (Berger 2002). Regulators may highlight this importance of 
organizational in relation to its effect on relationship lending during mergers and acquisitions. 
Consolidation may increase contracting problems and the behaviors of lending institutions (Berger 
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2002). Berger also finds that aside from complexity, regulators may find that banks that 
consolidate are not in the interest of small businesses. As the banks increase in complexity they 
are less likely to make relationship loans.  
 The risk of relationship lending not only lies between the bank-consumer exchange but 
also is influenced by external competition. Increased competition, more players in the market, 
results in less relationship lending and less benefit to consumers. With more options for consumers 
to choose from they would be less likely to remain loyal to one institution for their banking needs. 
In anticipation of shorter relationships, banks are less inclined to offer relationship-specific deals 
and advantages. The information advantage is no longer as important since many competitors may 
have it and because the bank that may have it at the current moment won’t be able to reuse the 
information over a long period of time (Boot, 1999).  
 
2.4. Prior Literature: Technological Advancement in Relationship Lending 
 
As technological innovation grows, banks and relationship lending may have serious 
changes as they adopt new practices. Technological advancements have allowed an increase of 
competition that has begun to threaten the survivability of small community banks. Not only that, 
but it also has left community banks with an exploitable position for larger banks looking to 
consolidate. (Elyasiani 2004). This change is likely due to the strength of community banks in 
their local knowledge and personal relationships with consumers that have eroded with more 
efficient ways of communication. “The reasons for the erosion include relaxation of the branching 
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and product mix regulations which gives large banks a freer hand to compete against small banks, 
new technologies rendering small scale operations inefficient in many areas of bank production, 
revolution in payment technology that renders distance unimportant, proliferation of investment 
options that make consumers less dependent on banks, deeper and broader financial markets that 
largely facilitate direct financing, and commoditization of financial assets. These changes have 
resulted in an increase in the share of the 10 largest banks from 28% of total banking assets in 
1986 to 76% in 2001 and a commensurate reduction in the share of the smaller community banks 
(DHU, 2004).” (Elyasiani 2004). Therefore, it seems that small community banks are losing a great 
deal of their market share as their competitive advantages have declined with technological 
advancements. New technology has made previous strengths obsolete and may create a divide 
between within the banking industry by size where large banks concentrate on “hard information” 
while small banks use “soft” information (Elyasiani 2004). However, with increasingly 
competitive environments, small banks are losing their niche advantage.  
 Technological advancement, notably credit scoring models, is one of the most important 
methods by which large banks have been able to encroach into small business lending formerly 
dominated by community banks (Ely 2001). Using credit scoring models has allowed banks to 
create a better overall picture of a borrower’s riskiness. “Larger banks (those with assets greater 
than $15 billion) were more likely to use credit scoring models than smaller banks (Federal 
Reserve Board 1997). To the extent that credit scoring reduces large banks’ costs of extending 
small business loans, it would be expected to narrow the gap between large and small banks’ 
emphasis on small business lending.” (Ely 2001). Large banks have an advantage by employing 
21 
 
technological advancements not only to decrease the cost of gauging risk but also increasing its 
accuracy by. Smaller banks in comparison are less likely to use these credit scoring models which 
increases their exposure to risk and the likelihood that they will lose on a loan to a borrower.  
 Relationship lending has been so costly due to the time necessary to acquire the information 
from small firms in order to develop those relationships (Petersen 2000). This difficulty in 
obtaining opaque information is what has been declining with newer methods of communicating 
information. Technological advancement allows greater access to information and “the evidence 
is consistent with greater information availability being responsible for the increasing distance 
between lender and borrower” (Petersen 2000). This further supports the idea that technological 
advancement has eroded the necessity of face-to-face relationships that were previously used to 
obtain ‘soft’ information. With increasing distances, community banks with local knowledge lose 
their competitive advantage and value.  
 Computers and information technology has allowed data transmission much cheaper by 
reducing transaction costs. The reduction in price has allowed a greater number of transactions by 
allowing products that were once too expensive, to now be offered to customers. (Mishkin 1999). 
Having easily transmittable information not only reduces the cost for all parties involved but it 
also makes itself reusable for multiple products. Having a greater amount of information has 
allowed lenders to better gauge good and bad credit risks through monitoring (Mishkin 1999). 
Information can now be used in credit scoring models and in part to determine a borrower’s overall 
risk when taking into consideration the other aspects of their lives. While allowing banks to have 
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a stronger picture of their borrowers, many banks continue to incorporate the loan officer’s 
judgment in conjunction with the ‘hard’ information to determine and sometimes override the 
advice of a credit scoring model (Mishkin 1999). 
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3. Data  
3.1. Data Gathering 
 
 For this study, data will be extracted from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) website for institutions within the state of Florida. Using the FDIC industry analysis and 
directory allowed a credible and standardized source of information. A custom report was 
generated that contained the dependent variable of ‘Community Bank Performance’ through 
performance ratios and values including Net Interest Margin, Loan and Lease Loss Provision to 
Assets, Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Net charge offs to loans, and Loss Allowance to 
Loans. The data from these variables were gathered from the annual numbers of December 31, 
2017. With the initial data set, there were 133 institutions after filtering by State. After filtering 
further for institutions with less than $1 billion in assets, there were a total of 111 institutions. 
These institutions were then further separated into five categories based on the size of their assets 
to group the institutions into classes: $0-$200,000 (Small), $200,001-$400,000 (Small-Medium), 
$400,001-$600,000 (Medium), $600,001-$800,000 (Medium-Large), and $800,001-$1,000,000 
(Large).  
 The independent variable, technological advancement, as measured by the number of 
online financial products/services offered on the institutions website was found by utilizing the 
web addresses of each respective institution from the FDIC reports. Upon viewing the websites of 
financial institutions, I determined three classes of clients that banks would service to: personal 
(individual) banking, business banking (small and mid-size businesses?), and corporate banking. 
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To obtain the number of online financial products/services based on the class of client, I went 
through each individual website, searching for those products/services to see if it was offered 
online. If the institution offered the product/service, then it would be denoted as a ‘1’ while a lack 
of the product/service was shown as a ‘0’. These numbers were then tallied to show the number of 
personal financial products/services, business financial products/services, commercial financial 
products/services, and finally the total number of financial products/services among categories.  
For personal banking these financial products included items such as: online statements, mobile 
app for personal banking, checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts, 
certificates of deposit, mortgage payments, commercial real estate loans, credit/debit cards, 
deposits, and transfers. For business banking, these financial products included: online statements, 
business bill pay, mobile app for business banking, business checking accounts, business savings 
accounts, business money market accounts, business certificate of deposits, business (remote) 
deposit services, business treasury management products, small business loans, business credit 
cards, and business transfers. For corporate (commercial) banking these financial products 
included: corporate deposit services, corporate treasury management, corporate lending, and 
commercial real estate loans.  
 
3.2. Data Calculations  
 
 After gathering all the financial data from the FDIC and all the qualitative data from the 
individual institution websites for their internet (online) products and services I began to determine 
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the calculations needed to find patterns and reason with the information. I decided that to organize 
and explain the data I would use a correlation table and table of descriptive statistics. The 
correlation table would identify patterns among variables that could affect one another, descriptive 
statistics would be used to analyze the data as an aggregate.   
 
3.3. Average Data  
 
 Upon gathering all the data as an aggregate, I could identify some patterns from the raw 
information prior to fully calculating and organizing it. After going through each institution’s 
website, I tallied the number of financial products that their website had shown to be available by 
keeping a running list composed with ‘1’ if the product had been shown to be available and a ‘0’ 
if it was not shown. At the end I summed the total number of financial products per institution.  
 Regardless of the institutions size, location, or financial performance, they appeared to 
have a great spread in terms of number of online financial products and the type of products they 
offered. For example, there were only a handful of intuitions that even offered any sort of corporate 
or commercial financial products or services. On the other hand, nearly all observations are at the 
minimum offered products to consumers in the form of online payments. The definition of 
community banks as institutions under $1 billion in assets may explain their concentration towards 
personal and business banking as opposed to the more complex and capital-intensive servicing 
required for corporate and commercial clients.   
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4. Hypothesis  
 
 Based upon the data that was available and the objective of answering the research question 
of “What is the impact of technological advancement on community bank performance?”, I was 
able to form a hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis: If there is a higher amount of alternative distribution channels then community 
bank lending performance will increase.  
As technological advancement increases there will be more products and services offered 
to cater to clients in all economic positions that will attempt to increase convenience and ease of 
use for services such as mobile application banking. Allowing clients to have the power to bank 
the way they choose to by giving them options not only benefits them but reciprocally increases 
the strength of commitment the client maintains with their respective institution. These sticky 
products create a symbiotic relationship where the client becomes dependent on the institution for 
their financial needs as the institution benefits through sustainable performance.  
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5. Methodology  
5.1. Definition of Variables  
5.1.1. Independent Variables  
 
 Independent variables grouped into four categories of services and products: personal, 
business, and corporate (commercial), and total. In total, there were 27 financial products or 
services that were each measured separately per institution to determine whether it was available 
or not. The number of personal financial products/services, number of business financial 
products/services, number of commercial financial products/services, and total number of personal 
financial products/services were treated as separate variables when measured against the 
dependent variables.  
An independent variable was needed to measure ‘Technological Advancement’. Several 
variables could have been used to measure how an independent variable could affect ‘Community 
Bank Performance’ such as measuring the money invested as a value or ratio towards network 
infrastructure or online platform maintenance. Similarly, an independent variable of measuring 
non-interest expenses could also have been used.  
However, many financial measures or ratios needed to determine a reliable way to measure 
‘Technological Advancement’ proved to be unreliable because of a lack of access to internal 
reports that would reveal the information stated above. Therefore, a proxy variable in the form of 
the number of financial products and services made available based off the institutions website 
was created to determine ‘Technological Advancement’. The basis being that an institution would 
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like to increase its online presence and consumer access by creating more products and services 
online to reach them.   
 
5.1.2. Dependent Variables  
 
 The dependent variables to measure ‘Community Bank Performance’ are performance 
ratios and values including Net Interest Margin, Loan and Lease Loss Provision to Assets, Return 
on Assets, Return on Equity, Net charge offs to loans, and Loss Allowance to Loans. Using these 
variables allowed a comprehensive view of performance by seeing metrics for both the risk and 
the return of each institution over a quarterly basis. Risk was measured through Loan Loss 
Allowance, Loan and Lease Loss Provision to Assets, Net charge offs to loans, and Loss 
Allowance to Loans. A decrease in any or all, of these variables would indicate a simultaneous 
decrease in the risk of the institution’s portfolio. Return was measured by Net Interest Margin, 
Return on Equity, and Return on Assets. An increase in any or all, of these variables would indicate 
a simultaneous increase in the return of the institution’s portfolio. 
 
5.1.3. Control Variables  
 
 There were two main controlled variables: the size of the institutions separated by assets 
and the separation of the types of online financial products/services offered by each institution. 
Both variables were controlled in order prevent overarching conclusions that an increase/decrease 
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in all independent variables would lead to an increase/decrease in all dependent variables. The size 
of the institutions even in the same ‘community bank’ category over under $1 billion in assets can 
be affected very differently and simultaneously not all their financial products/services will be 
affected equally. The reason that there was a separation in both the types of online financial 
products/services and the size of the assets of the institution was because these both variables may 
be catered to specific customers. For example, small or small/medium sized institutions may 
specifically be targeting the consumer demographic for personal online financial 
products/services, there lack of size and capital could even be a factor on their ability to participate 
in more complex commercial/corporate banking. On the other hand, medium/large and large 
institutions may have personal, business, and commercial online financial products/services but 
may specifically be targeting the commercial/corporate demographic because of their ability to 
handle the more complex and lucrative deals.  
 The size of the institutions was controlled by separating them into five different categories: 
$0-$200,000 (Small), $200,001-$400,000 (Small-Medium), $400,001-$600,000 (Medium), 
$600,001-$800,000 (Medium-Large), and $800,001-$1,000,000 (Large). By doing so, changes are 
reflected by each category and not as ‘community banks’ which may lead to over generalizations.  
 The types of financial products/services offered by each institution were also controlled by 
separating them into four categories: the number of personal financial products/services, number 
of business financial products/services, number of commercial financial products/services, and 
finally the total number of financial products/services among categories. By doing so, using these 
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independent variables only affects the institutions within these categories without referring to 
‘community banks’ as a whole. 
 
5.2. Empirical Methods and Results 
5.2.1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
 The table of descriptive statistics was used to summarize major categories of the data set 
for each size of institution class (SM-Table 4.1, SM-MD Table 4.2, MD Table 4.3, MD-LG Table 
4.4, and LG Table 4.5) on a quarterly basis. Starting with the SM class of institutions in Table 4.1, 
the most apparent trend are the decreases in mean from Q1 to Q4 in Loss Allowance to Loans. 
Simultaneously, these results are paired with an increase in Net Interest Margin, higher ROA, and 
higher ROE. Observing these results indicates a reduction in risk as indicated by the lowering of 
the Loan Loss Allowance combined with a higher performance in the financial ratios.  
 For institutions in the SM-MD class in Table 4.2, the most unique trends were observed in 
the decrease of Loan and Lease Loss Provision to Assets, decrease in Net Charge Offs to Loans, 
and decrease to Loss Allowance to Loans. These variables all indicate reductions in risk by 
reducing the amount of funds directed at problem loans and the expected losses from credit risk.  
 Quarterly progression from Q1 to Q4 also revealed favorable increases in ROA and ROE 
along with decreases in Loan Loss Allowance and Loss Allowance to Loans for institutions in the 
MD (Middle) size class of banks in Table 4.3. Like their counterparts, institutions in the MD-LG 
class of institutions, Table 4.4, experienced increasing amounts of net interest margin regardless 
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of the class of financial product, increasing ROA, increasing ROE, and a decline in their Loss 
Allowance to Loans. Finally, the largest size of bank classes, Table 4.5, performed well in in return 
measures such as increasing net interest margin, ROA, and ROE. However, experienced 
simultaneous average performance measures in categories such as Loan and Lease Loss Provision 
to Assets and Net Charge Offs to Loans. 
 
5.2.2. Correlation Table 
 
 Correlation tables were created to observe all performance metrics in risk and return for 
the variables: Loan Loss Allowance, Net interest margin, Loan and Lease Loss Provision to Assets, 
Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), net charge-offs to loans, loss allowance to 
loans, number of personal financial products/services, business products/services, and total 
number of financial products/services. The correlation tables allowed an understanding of the 
interrelatedness between the independent and dependent variables. Each correlation table was 
created per quarter of the year to identify any differences in results. Unfortunately, going through 
each quarter, correlations among variables were relatively low. In Q1, Table 2.4, the highest 
correlations were between the number of business financial products/services and loan loss 
allowance at -0.14. Q2. Table 2.3, also had few major correlations. Q3 (Table 2.2) and Q4 (Table 
2.1) however, displayed positive correlations between net all products, personal, business, and 
total to net interest margin ranging from 0.130 to 0.168. 
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6. Discussion  
 
 Despite the attempt to separate variables and to identify answers to the question of “What 
impact does technological advancement have on community bank lending?” there are several 
limitations to the study. Firstly, there’s no method to track when each institution enabled or placed 
a specific online financial product or service on their website over time. For example, if an 
institution recently engaged in the development of a mobile banking application there is no way to 
track as an aggregate when that service became available on the institution’s website. Having this 
limitation means that data can only be tracked when the product is already there and not how it has 
affected the dependent variable, community bank lending, over time.  
Secondly, perhaps a better gauge of understanding how technological advancement can be 
used to affect community bank lending is to measure directly how much the institution invests into 
their technology. How much do they invest, how high are their non-interest expenses, how often 
and at what cost do they upgrade infrastructure or server? The study is limited from that proprietary 
information within the institution’s own income statements and balance sheets that are not public 
record and therefore the study has had to rely on other metrics to determine the answer.  
Finally, the financial data used at the time of the study is not the most current because it is reliant 
upon quarterly reports from the FDIC. Therefore, real-world situations based on the data may be 
different than what the study is using.  
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7. Conclusion  
 
 In conclusion, the study seeks to investigate “How does technological advancement affect 
community bank lending?”. The original purpose of the study was to identify a correlation between 
the availability of online financial products/services to several consumer groups and how that 
would be reflected in the performance of community banks. Through descriptive statistics and 
correlation tables, the study has isolated independent and dependent variables to measure their 
relatedness. Considering all the tests from the data that was gathered, I have concluded that there 
is a direct relationship between technological advancement and community bank lending. I have 
identified that as the number of financial products/services increases, performance measures to 
determine risk and return also tend to increase in unison. The most obvious and simplest way of 
identifying this trend is in the observation of the correlation tables between the variables such as 
Table 3. Depending on the size of the institution and specifically what kind of class of products 
that they offer, in a significant amount of cases, performance tends to improve as the number of 
products increases. This essentially shows that the research has achieved the research goal by not 
only finding a correlation between technological advancement and community bank performance, 
but has also shown a positive correlation. The relationship between the two can possibly be 
explained by consumers having greater access to more flexible options. Convenience along with 
clarity may be possible explanations as to why having more products tends to increase the 
performance of community banks.  
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9. Appendix 
 
Table 1 
 
Variable Name Description 
nimy Net interest margin 
ELNATRY Loan and lease loss provision to assets 
roa Return on assets (ROA) 
roe Return on Equity (ROE) 
ntlnlsr Net charge-offs to loans 
lnatresr Loss allowance to loans 
SM $0-$200,000 (million in assets) 
SM-MD $200,001-$400,000 (million in assets) 
MD $400,001-$600,000 (million in assets) 
MD-LG $600,001-$800,000 (million in assets) 
LG $800,001-$1,000,000 (million in assets) 
 
Table 2.1 - 12.31.17 – Correlation Table  
 
Total # of Financial Products/Services lnatres 12.31 nimy 12.31 elnatry 12.31 roa 12.31 roe 12.31 ntlnlsr 12.31 lnatresr 12.31 Personal # of Financial Products/Services Business # of Financial Products/Services Total # of Financial Products/Services
lnatres 12.31 1.000
nimy 12.31 -0.155 1.000
elnatry 12.31 0.045 0.453 1.000
roa 12.31 0.107 0.082 0.006 1.000
roe 12.31 0.157 0.111 0.009 0.777 1.000
ntlnlsr 12.31 0.017 0.428 0.734 -0.122 -0.189 1.000
lnatresr 12.31 -0.131 0.153 0.159 0.049 0.015 0.040 1.000
Personal # of Financial Products/Services -0.049 0.137 -0.033 0.090 0.107 0.079 -0.104 1.000
Business # of Financial Products/Services -0.063 0.130 -0.003 -0.077 0.064 0.063 -0.033 0.572 1.000
Total # of Financial Products/Services -0.070 0.148 -0.011 -0.016 0.093 0.103 -0.073 0.802 0.932 1.000
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Table 2.2 - 09.30.17 – Correlation Table 
 
 
Table 2.3 - 06.30.17 – Correlation Table 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 - 03.31.17 – Correlation Table 
 
 
Total # of Financial Products/Services lnatres 09.30 nimy 09.30 elnatry 09.30 roa 09.30 roe 09.30 ntlnlsr 09.30 lnatresr 09.30 Personal # of Financial Products/Services Business # of Financial Products/Services Total # of Financial Products/Services
lnatres 09.30 1.000
nimy 09.30 -0.161 1.000
elnatry 09.30 0.069 0.435 1.000
roa 09.30 0.044 0.152 -0.017 1.000
roe 09.30 0.090 0.155 -0.001 0.707 1.000
ntlnlsr 09.30 0.031 0.375 0.718 -0.126 -0.152 1.000
lnatresr 09.30 -0.127 0.129 0.159 0.064 0.022 0.047 1.000
Personal # of Financial Products/Services -0.047 0.159 -0.032 0.124 0.109 0.058 -0.106 1.000
Business # of Financial Products/Services -0.061 0.144 -0.005 -0.027 0.107 0.054 -0.026 0.572 1.000
Total # of Financial Products/Services -0.068 0.168 -0.012 0.028 0.118 0.094 -0.070 0.802 0.932 1.000
Total # of Financial Products/Services lnatres 06.30 nimy 06.30 elnatry 06.30 roa 06.30 roe 06.30 ntlnlsr 06.30 lnatresr 06.30 Personal # of Financial Products/Services Business # of Financial Products/Services Total # of Financial Products/Services
lnatres 06.30 1.000
nimy 06.30 -0.189 1.000
elnatry 06.30 0.065 0.465 1.000
roa 06.30 0.025 0.025 0.092 1.000
roe 06.30 0.066 0.089 0.059 0.705 1.000
ntlnlsr 06.30 0.048 0.356 0.599 -0.019 -0.048 1.000
lnatresr 06.30 -0.129 0.140 0.167 0.097 0.079 0.034 1.000
Personal # of Financial Products/Services -0.067 0.029 -0.012 -0.041 0.027 0.038 -0.106 1.000
Business # of Financial Products/Services -0.064 0.065 -0.002 -0.127 0.069 0.038 -0.025 0.536 1.000
Total # of Financial Products/Services -0.079 0.066 -0.002 -0.109 0.061 0.090 -0.069 0.777 0.930 1
Total # of Financial Products/Services lnatres 03.31 nimy 03.31 elnatry 03.31 roa 03.31 roe 03.31 ntlnlsr 03.31 lnatresr 03.31 Personal # of Financial Products/Services Business # of Financial Products/Services Total # of Financial Products/Services
lnatres 03.31 1.000
nimy 03.31 -0.084 1.000
elnatry 03.31 0.041 0.544 1.000
roa 03.31 0.062 -0.030 0.062 1.000
roe 03.31 0.065 -0.007 0.018 0.594 1.000
ntlnlsr 03.31 0.079 0.255 0.465 -0.076 -0.081 1.000
lnatresr 03.31 -0.105 0.129 0.126 0.166 0.287 -0.007 1.000
Personal # of Financial Products/Services -0.086 -0.046 -0.028 -0.016 0.074 0.041 -0.006 1.000
Business # of Financial Products/Services -0.040 0.036 0.006 -0.135 0.050 0.035 -0.002 0.536 1.000
Total # of Financial Products/Services -0.067 0.015 -0.005 -0.113 0.058 0.099 -0.014 0.777 0.930 1.000
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 Table 3 – Correlation Table Graph 
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Descriptive Statistics – SM Table 4.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Standard Error Median Mode Standard Deviation Sample Variance Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Sum Count
lnatres 12.31 1142.872 144.425 862.000 400.000 901.934 813484.273 1.643 1.379 3991.000 0.000 3991.000 44572.000 39
lnatres 09.30 1137.103 143.236 874.000 #N/A 894.507 800142.147 1.565 1.377 3904.000 0.000 3904.000 44347.000 39
lnatres 06.30 1149.692 142.327 964.000 #N/A 888.833 790024.166 1.620 1.376 3895.000 0.000 3895.000 44838.000 39
lnatres 03.31 1164.744 146.062 963.000 #N/A 912.158 832031.564 1.519 1.379 3915.000 0.000 3915.000 45425.000 39
nimy 12.31 3.622 0.122 3.920 #N/A 0.761 0.579 -0.203 -0.695 3.048 2.002 5.050 141.246 39
nimy 09.30 3.599 0.124 3.870 #N/A 0.775 0.600 -0.130 -0.608 3.217 1.962 5.180 140.352 39
nimy 06.30 3.577 0.126 3.906 #N/A 0.785 0.617 -0.170 -0.549 3.243 1.964 5.207 139.501 39
nimy 03.31 3.548 0.130 3.764 #N/A 0.814 0.662 0.005 -0.253 3.396 1.931 5.327 138.370 39
elnatry 12.31 0.027 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.168 0.028 2.865 1.171 0.883 -0.295 0.588 1.048 39
elnatry 09.30 0.022 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.183 0.034 3.619 0.926 1.064 -0.404 0.660 0.841 39
elnatry 06.30 -0.011 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.204 0.042 3.376 -0.962 1.119 -0.621 0.498 -0.418 39
elnatry 03.31 -0.016 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.282 0.080 10.832 -1.276 2.113 -1.200 0.912 -0.622 39
roa 12.31 0.532 0.187 0.396 #N/A 1.171 1.371 13.694 2.804 7.790 -1.648 6.142 20.748 39
roa 09.30 0.658 0.196 0.501 #N/A 1.223 1.495 17.638 3.292 8.625 -1.785 6.840 25.667 39
roa 06.30 0.656 0.186 0.480 #N/A 1.161 1.347 15.695 2.870 8.254 -1.901 6.353 25.568 39
roa 03.31 0.701 0.193 0.451 #N/A 1.206 1.454 14.033 2.825 8.187 -1.689 6.498 27.326 39
roe 12.31 3.032 1.213 3.942 #N/A 7.576 57.391 4.162 -1.599 39.404 -23.217 16.186 118.244 39
roe 09.30 4.064 1.147 5.492 #N/A 7.164 51.327 7.696 -2.164 41.730 -25.807 15.923 158.509 39
roe 06.30 4.319 1.475 5.586 #N/A 9.212 84.861 15.834 -3.150 62.871 -41.230 21.641 168.456 39
roe 03.31 6.275 2.704 4.620 #N/A 16.885 285.115 20.444 3.367 131.322 -37.560 93.762 244.733 39
ntlnlsr 12.31 0.073 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.324 0.105 3.649 1.439 1.793 -0.624 1.169 2.765 38
ntlnlsr 09.30 0.071 0.053 0.013 0.000 0.324 0.105 4.186 1.118 1.959 -0.739 1.220 2.685 38
ntlnlsr 06.30 0.011 0.046 0.004 0.000 0.286 0.082 2.669 -0.731 1.472 -0.831 0.641 0.435 38
ntlnlsr 03.31 -0.044 0.057 -0.001 0.000 0.351 0.123 8.190 -2.209 2.103 -1.429 0.674 -1.686 38
lnatresr 12.31 1.616 0.179 1.225 #N/A 1.100 1.211 6.232 2.421 5.106 0.420 5.527 61.414 38
lnatresr 09.30 1.641 0.174 1.277 #N/A 1.072 1.149 5.172 2.147 5.044 0.296 5.341 62.348 38
lnatresr 06.30 1.674 0.170 1.305 #N/A 1.046 1.095 5.098 2.109 5.029 0.296 5.325 63.616 38
lnatresr 03.31 1.712 0.162 1.322 #N/A 0.997 0.994 3.655 1.750 4.749 0.179 4.928 65.053 38
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Descriptive Statistics – SM-MD Table 4.2 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Standard Error Median Mode Standard Deviation Sample Variance Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Sum Count
lnatres 12.31 2914.971 277.934 2453.500 #N/A 1620.621 2626411.726 5.728 2.275 7278.000 1111.000 8389.000 99109.000 34
lnatres 09.30 2917.676 250.880 2502.500 #N/A 1462.869 2139985.074 4.977 2.043 6706.000 1098.000 7804.000 99201.000 34
lnatres 06.30 2861.235 237.701 2573.000 2134.000 1386.026 1921067.094 4.518 1.884 6597.000 1077.000 7674.000 97282.000 34
lnatres 03.31 2766.912 202.030 2478.500 #N/A 1178.028 1387750.143 2.981 1.429 5737.000 968.000 6705.000 94075.000 34
nimy 12.31 3.919 0.151 3.815 #N/A 0.878 0.771 21.175 4.149 5.447 2.936 8.383 133.235 34
nimy 09.30 3.899 0.150 3.760 #N/A 0.875 0.765 20.971 4.132 5.413 2.924 8.336 132.560 34
nimy 06.30 3.865 0.152 3.701 #N/A 0.884 0.781 21.214 4.144 5.520 2.839 8.359 131.413 34
nimy 03.31 3.824 0.150 3.654 #N/A 0.875 0.766 20.747 4.090 5.481 2.772 8.253 130.025 34
elnatry 12.31 0.228 0.117 0.054 0.000 0.685 0.469 11.921 3.417 3.509 -0.422 3.088 7.760 34
elnatry 09.30 0.253 0.130 0.056 0.000 0.760 0.577 11.537 3.375 3.946 -0.562 3.384 8.596 34
elnatry 06.30 0.238 0.144 0.000 0.000 0.842 0.709 12.843 3.563 4.571 -0.845 3.725 8.097 34
elnatry 03.31 0.215 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.826 0.682 11.760 2.943 5.235 -1.537 3.697 7.314 34
roa 12.31 0.883 0.149 0.805 #N/A 0.867 0.752 0.422 0.236 4.124 -1.262 2.862 30.019 34
roa 09.30 0.946 0.143 0.780 #N/A 0.833 0.694 1.510 0.159 4.425 -1.419 3.006 32.178 34
roa 06.30 0.952 0.126 0.743 #N/A 0.734 0.539 0.766 1.008 3.338 -0.284 3.054 32.371 34
roa 03.31 0.906 0.127 0.661 #N/A 0.739 0.546 2.647 1.486 3.641 -0.250 3.391 30.788 34
roe 12.31 8.729 1.415 8.074 #N/A 8.252 68.091 -0.010 0.103 34.778 -11.415 23.363 296.780 34
roe 09.30 9.328 1.334 8.243 #N/A 7.777 60.474 0.809 -0.031 36.889 -12.511 24.378 317.141 34
roe 06.30 9.424 1.203 8.328 #N/A 7.015 49.207 -0.142 0.748 28.397 -2.425 25.972 320.411 34
roe 03.31 9.052 1.262 7.440 #N/A 7.359 54.152 1.868 1.352 34.270 -2.114 32.155 307.770 34
ntlnlsr 12.31 0.208 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.542 0.294 11.059 3.223 2.654 -0.140 2.514 7.072 34
ntlnlsr 09.30 0.208 0.109 -0.001 0.000 0.634 0.402 10.942 3.314 2.945 -0.188 2.757 7.064 34
ntlnlsr 06.30 0.172 0.097 -0.005 0.000 0.568 0.323 12.408 3.296 3.040 -0.313 2.727 5.862 34
ntlnlsr 03.31 0.222 0.109 -0.001 0.000 0.635 0.403 8.500 2.824 3.227 -0.411 2.816 7.559 34
lnatresr 12.31 1.427 0.120 1.308 #N/A 0.700 0.489 3.030 1.762 3.067 0.631 3.698 48.527 34
lnatresr 09.30 1.489 0.122 1.321 #N/A 0.712 0.507 3.436 1.805 3.229 0.668 3.897 50.626 34
lnatresr 06.30 1.492 0.123 1.275 #N/A 0.719 0.516 3.220 1.792 3.125 0.698 3.823 50.742 34
lnatresr 03.31 1.496 0.115 1.350 #N/A 0.672 0.452 3.108 1.709 2.985 0.672 3.657 50.851 34
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Descriptive Statistics – MD Table 4.3 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Standard Error Median Mode Standard Deviation Sample Variance Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Sum Count
lnatres 12.31 4024.130 287.464 3836.000 3502.000 1378.627 1900612.573 0.599 0.946 4881.000 2175.000 7056.000 92555.000 23
lnatres 09.30 3987.826 289.883 3670.000 #N/A 1390.232 1932745.514 0.807 1.065 5231.000 2019.000 7250.000 91720.000 23
lnatres 06.30 3961.261 303.682 3743.000 #N/A 1456.410 2121129.565 1.974 1.367 6219.000 1783.000 8002.000 91109.000 23
lnatres 03.31 3897.870 322.906 3672.000 #N/A 1548.605 2398177.664 2.027 1.340 6801.000 1458.000 8259.000 89651.000 23
nimy 12.31 3.622 0.088 3.650 #N/A 0.423 0.179 0.232 0.325 1.687 2.809 4.496 83.302 23
nimy 09.30 3.604 0.092 3.579 #N/A 0.443 0.197 0.520 0.471 1.828 2.737 4.565 82.887 23
nimy 06.30 3.566 0.097 3.544 #N/A 0.463 0.214 0.525 0.440 1.884 2.705 4.590 82.015 23
nimy 03.31 3.535 0.095 3.509 #N/A 0.457 0.209 1.111 0.242 1.967 2.598 4.566 81.312 23
elnatry 12.31 0.057 0.027 0.042 0.000 0.129 0.017 0.338 -0.429 0.539 -0.236 0.303 1.314 23
elnatry 09.30 0.034 0.026 0.015 0.000 0.127 0.016 0.177 -0.519 0.499 -0.264 0.236 0.791 23
elnatry 06.30 0.047 0.025 0.014 0.000 0.119 0.014 1.270 -0.282 0.536 -0.238 0.298 1.071 23
elnatry 03.31 0.033 0.023 0.007 0.000 0.111 0.012 6.116 -1.534 0.555 -0.351 0.204 0.763 23
roa 12.31 0.687 0.131 0.774 #N/A 0.630 0.397 0.452 -0.433 2.706 -0.855 1.851 15.791 23
roa 09.30 0.713 0.118 0.771 #N/A 0.565 0.319 3.290 -1.361 2.650 -1.044 1.606 16.398 23
roa 06.30 0.731 0.096 0.757 #N/A 0.459 0.211 1.062 -0.534 2.055 -0.471 1.585 16.812 23
roa 03.31 0.646 0.103 0.646 #N/A 0.493 0.243 2.738 -0.929 2.377 -0.814 1.563 14.847 23
roe 12.31 6.607 2.015 7.569 #N/A 9.666 93.431 5.266 -1.480 50.162 -25.812 24.350 151.960 23
roe 09.30 6.829 2.064 7.405 #N/A 9.901 98.028 9.490 -2.370 54.214 -30.594 23.620 157.069 23
roe 06.30 7.588 1.429 7.229 #N/A 6.852 46.953 3.902 -0.610 36.556 -13.271 23.285 174.524 23
roe 03.31 6.368 1.735 6.415 #N/A 8.318 69.197 6.906 -1.588 45.979 -22.755 23.224 146.465 23
ntlnlsr 12.31 0.042 0.031 0.040 #N/A 0.148 0.022 1.441 0.913 0.596 -0.164 0.432 0.964 23
ntlnlsr 09.30 0.012 0.024 0.017 #N/A 0.114 0.013 -0.628 -0.428 0.366 -0.194 0.171 0.279 23
ntlnlsr 06.30 0.028 0.024 0.014 0.000 0.115 0.013 1.822 0.770 0.520 -0.170 0.350 0.645 23
ntlnlsr 03.31 0.061 0.025 0.013 0.000 0.118 0.014 0.671 1.145 0.433 -0.088 0.346 1.411 23
lnatresr 12.31 1.260 0.142 1.031 #N/A 0.682 0.465 6.535 2.451 3.011 0.638 3.650 28.983 23
lnatresr 09.30 1.297 0.153 1.038 #N/A 0.733 0.538 7.152 2.517 3.335 0.585 3.921 29.830 23
lnatresr 06.30 1.305 0.143 1.031 #N/A 0.687 0.472 5.010 2.145 3.063 0.534 3.597 30.014 23
lnatresr 03.31 1.319 0.143 1.083 #N/A 0.687 0.472 4.537 2.013 3.110 0.456 3.566 30.342 23
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Descriptive Statistics – MD-LG Table 4.4 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean Standard Error Median Mode Standard Deviation Sample Variance Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Sum Count
lnatres 12.31 6447.250 693.384 6329.000 #N/A 1961.187 3846253.357 1.199 0.939 6058.000 4227.000 10285.000 51578.000 8
lnatres 09.30 6516.000 756.638 6022.500 #N/A 2140.096 4580012.571 -0.573 0.590 6054.000 4115.000 10169.000 52128.000 8
lnatres 06.30 6453.875 765.550 5928.500 #N/A 2165.303 4688537.554 -0.461 0.574 6299.000 3887.000 10186.000 51631.000 8
lnatres 03.31 6074.143 860.135 5467.000 #N/A 2275.704 5178830.810 0.046 0.997 6346.000 3670.000 10016.000 42519.000 7
nimy 12.31 3.642 0.220 3.792 #N/A 0.622 0.387 1.406 -1.029 2.034 2.420 4.454 29.133 8
nimy 09.30 3.616 0.223 3.776 #N/A 0.632 0.400 1.336 -0.971 2.076 2.384 4.460 28.932 8
nimy 06.30 3.601 0.226 3.782 #N/A 0.641 0.410 1.362 -0.980 2.103 2.347 4.449 28.804 8
nimy 03.31 3.795 0.171 3.918 #N/A 0.452 0.204 0.004 -0.226 1.377 3.091 4.468 26.568 7
elnatry 12.31 0.109 0.031 0.121 0.000 0.088 0.008 -0.755 0.119 0.250 0.000 0.250 0.874 8
elnatry 09.30 0.112 0.032 0.128 0.000 0.089 0.008 -1.207 -0.027 0.244 0.000 0.244 0.894 8
elnatry 06.30 0.130 0.043 0.121 0.000 0.121 0.015 2.011 1.157 0.377 0.000 0.377 1.039 8
elnatry 03.31 0.146 0.036 0.158 #N/A 0.095 0.009 -0.729 -0.503 0.268 0.000 0.268 1.024 7
roa 12.31 0.832 0.224 0.647 #N/A 0.634 0.402 1.949 1.469 1.937 0.200 2.137 6.654 8
roa 09.30 0.949 0.210 0.713 #N/A 0.594 0.353 3.914 2.006 1.776 0.501 2.277 7.594 8
roa 06.30 0.940 0.222 0.731 #N/A 0.627 0.394 3.027 1.760 1.894 0.403 2.298 7.523 8
roa 03.31 0.890 0.262 0.577 #N/A 0.693 0.480 3.606 1.885 2.002 0.328 2.330 6.232 7
roe 12.31 7.737 2.000 6.319 #N/A 5.657 32.002 1.470 1.144 17.362 1.664 19.026 61.892 8
roe 09.30 8.692 1.871 6.751 #N/A 5.293 28.016 2.989 1.654 16.239 3.865 20.104 69.534 8
roe 06.30 8.540 2.005 6.142 #N/A 5.670 32.150 3.090 1.739 17.481 3.360 20.841 68.323 8
roe 03.31 8.487 2.376 5.821 #N/A 6.287 39.520 3.808 1.844 18.848 2.735 21.582 59.410 7
ntlnlsr 12.31 0.074 0.061 -0.013 #N/A 0.172 0.030 2.969 1.839 0.495 -0.047 0.447 0.595 8
ntlnlsr 09.30 0.033 0.036 -0.005 #N/A 0.102 0.010 5.540 2.284 0.307 -0.035 0.272 0.260 8
ntlnlsr 06.30 0.025 0.045 -0.017 #N/A 0.126 0.016 6.520 2.495 0.383 -0.056 0.328 0.203 8
ntlnlsr 03.31 0.057 0.085 0.001 #N/A 0.226 0.051 4.400 1.910 0.700 -0.166 0.535 0.399 7
lnatresr 12.31 1.557 0.257 1.383 #N/A 0.726 0.527 3.024 1.714 2.166 0.962 3.128 12.459 8
lnatresr 09.30 1.605 0.272 1.391 #N/A 0.769 0.592 2.097 1.438 2.286 0.922 3.208 12.838 8
lnatresr 06.30 1.625 0.278 1.403 #N/A 0.786 0.618 2.746 1.596 2.371 0.936 3.307 12.996 8
lnatresr 03.31 1.391 0.157 1.248 #N/A 0.416 0.173 -0.631 0.696 1.167 0.905 2.071 9.734 7
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Descriptive Statistics – LG Table 4.5 
 
 
Mean Standard Error Median Mode Standard Deviation Sample Variance Kurtosis Skewness Range Minimum Maximum Sum Count
lnatres 12.31 6926.833 1064.366 7584.500 #N/A 2607.154 6797253.767 -1.472 -0.357 6448.000 3752.000 10200.000 41561.000 6
lnatres 09.30 6865.333 1040.428 7764.500 #N/A 2548.517 6494940.267 -1.683 -0.556 6099.000 3698.000 9797.000 41192.000 6
lnatres 06.30 6698.500 1017.120 7210.000 #N/A 2491.425 6207197.900 -1.290 -0.197 6336.000 3670.000 10006.000 40191.000 6
lnatres 03.31 6454.667 911.850 7014.000 #N/A 2233.567 4988821.867 -1.851 -0.478 5279.000 3643.000 8922.000 38728.000 6
nimy 12.31 3.380 0.166 3.416 #N/A 0.406 0.164 -0.289 -0.196 1.149 2.786 3.935 20.277 6
nimy 09.30 3.362 0.161 3.409 #N/A 0.394 0.155 -0.627 -0.271 1.093 2.788 3.881 20.169 6
nimy 06.30 3.319 0.153 3.372 #N/A 0.375 0.141 -0.492 -0.351 1.044 2.764 3.807 19.917 6
nimy 03.31 3.247 0.157 3.256 #N/A 0.386 0.149 -0.966 -0.268 1.030 2.686 3.716 19.481 6
elnatry 12.31 0.014 0.029 0.007 #N/A 0.072 0.005 -1.201 0.357 0.185 -0.069 0.117 0.081 6
elnatry 09.30 -0.001 0.039 0.002 #N/A 0.096 0.009 -0.431 -0.082 0.269 -0.137 0.131 -0.007 6
elnatry 06.30 -0.025 0.045 0.004 #N/A 0.109 0.012 -0.371 -0.856 0.287 -0.200 0.088 -0.151 6
elnatry 03.31 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.001 2.142 0.370 0.076 -0.032 0.044 0.021 6
roa 12.31 1.034 0.395 0.952 #N/A 0.968 0.938 1.315 0.845 2.836 -0.156 2.680 6.205 6
roa 09.30 0.930 0.130 0.828 #N/A 0.319 0.102 -0.565 0.786 0.852 0.576 1.428 5.579 6
roa 06.30 0.956 0.125 0.848 #N/A 0.307 0.094 0.333 0.972 0.849 0.615 1.464 5.737 6
roa 03.31 0.923 0.105 0.804 #N/A 0.256 0.066 -1.847 0.792 0.573 0.675 1.248 5.538 6
roe 12.31 11.413 4.122 10.989 #N/A 10.097 101.945 0.526 0.610 29.044 -1.236 27.808 68.478 6
roe 09.30 10.044 1.752 8.808 #N/A 4.292 18.420 -1.554 0.664 10.209 5.982 16.190 60.262 6
roe 06.30 10.405 1.714 9.424 #N/A 4.199 17.635 -0.900 0.722 10.449 6.377 16.826 62.432 6
roe 03.31 10.138 1.516 9.111 #N/A 3.713 13.789 -1.817 0.545 8.784 6.140 14.924 60.830 6
ntlnlsr 12.31 -0.074 0.051 -0.034 #N/A 0.125 0.016 1.365 -1.325 0.327 -0.295 0.032 -0.444 6
ntlnlsr 09.30 -0.117 0.073 -0.041 #N/A 0.178 0.032 -1.873 -0.779 0.395 -0.358 0.037 -0.704 6
ntlnlsr 06.30 -0.152 0.095 -0.057 #N/A 0.233 0.054 0.262 -1.137 0.606 -0.545 0.061 -0.911 6
ntlnlsr 03.31 -0.078 0.041 -0.027 #N/A 0.101 0.010 -1.876 -0.846 0.214 -0.214 0.000 -0.467 6
lnatresr 12.31 0.964 0.134 1.007 #N/A 0.328 0.108 -1.663 -0.322 0.801 0.531 1.333 5.783 6
lnatresr 09.30 0.972 0.141 1.036 #N/A 0.346 0.120 -1.802 -0.422 0.803 0.524 1.327 5.830 6
lnatresr 06.30 0.958 0.139 1.027 #N/A 0.341 0.116 -1.367 -0.293 0.875 0.518 1.393 5.750 6
lnatresr 03.31 0.943 0.129 1.063 #N/A 0.316 0.100 -1.866 -0.745 0.703 0.525 1.227 5.656 6
